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PETER M. GERHART

THE SUPREME COURT AND
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
THE (NEAR) TRIUMPH OF
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

Since the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, 1 the Supreme Court
has struggled to find an appropriate analytical and IIJ,ethodological
framework for applying the federal antitrust laws. For a while, it
appeared as if the Court might succeed. In a series of six cases since
197 5, 2 the Court seemed to be moving toward a comprehensive,
integrated antitrust methodology based on economic analysis and
_largely following the writing of Chicago school scholars such
as Robert Bork 3 and Richard Posner. 4 Last Term, however, in
Arizona v. Maricopa Cou11ty Medical Society/ the Court missed a
Peter M. Gerhart is Professor of Law, Olfio State University College of Law.
I

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1980).

2

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441
U.S. I (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); and Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
3
BORK, THE A.vnTRIJST PARADOX (1978); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price-Fixi11g a11d Market Divisio11 (pts. 1-2), 74 YALE LJ- 775 (1965); 75 YALE LJ- 373
(1966).
4
POSNER, A.VTITRIJST LAW: A."' ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-67 (1967); POSNER &
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRIJST (2d ed. 1981). See also Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L REV. 263 (1981); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U.
CHI. L REV. 886 (1981).

5

102 S. Ct_. 2466 (1982).
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significant opportunity to complete its methodological framevvork,
and in doing so, made antitrust analysis once again confused and
haphazard.
This development is unfortunate. There is a central analytical
model underlying the antitrust laws, and the Supreme Court has a
special responsibility to identify and to articulate that model in
order to increase the coherence, rationality, and predictability of
antitrust analysis. Maricopa provided the Court with a splendid
opportunity to do so, and the Court's failure to capitalize on that
opportunity is dispiriting, even though the plurality decision may
be short-lived.

I. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Sound antitrust analysis must address two interrelated
tasks. The first task is substantive: to identify accurately legislative
purposes of the antitrust laws. This is difficult enough, but it is
complicated by a second, procedural task: to find an appropriate
balance between certainty and fidelity to legislative purpose and to
fashion rules of conduct that are reasonably clear, precise, and
easily applicable without sacrificing substantive antitrust values.
Because the search for an accurate definition of antitrust values
takes place in a legal system that promotes clarity, precision, and
ease of applicability, the tensions between fidelity and certainty are
great, creating the danger, evident in the history of antitrust doctrine, that more weight will be given to promoting certainty than is
warranted.
Prior to 1l1aricopa, the Supreme Court had begun to embrace two
postulates suggested by Chicago school scholars that would minimize the conflicts between the goals of certainty and fidelity. The
first postulate, one advocated by Robert Bork as early as 1965, 6 is to
restore the per se rule as a component of substantive antitrust analysis. This postulate is of immeasurable importance. V\lhen per se
rules are applicable, issues of the purpose and effect of a person's
conduct are irrelevant. Almost since their inception, however, the
per se rules have been a source of mystery and misunderstanding.
Per se rules were often thought of as if they had self-executing
6

L.J.

Bork, Tbe Rule of Reaso11 a11d tbc Per Sc Coucept: Price Fixi11g and Market Divisio11, 74 Y,\LE
77 5 (1965).
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applicability to easily recognizable conduct, or as literal statements
whose primary function was to add simplicity and certainty to
antitrust law. As a result, antitrust analysis was deflected from a
consideration of underlying substantive policies to a largely semantic effort to "characterize" conduct, and courts have had inordinate difficulty making and explaining decisions to apply per se
rules.
The postulate that the Supreme Court appeared to embrace prior
to Maricopa would restore the original conception of the scope and
role of the per se rules-one that views the rules as a summation of
substantive antitrust policy and hence to be applied only after analysis of policy considerations. Were this postulate fully accepted it
would be significant. It would mean that decisions to apply a per se
rule must be based on the substantive policies of the Sherman Act,
rather than on linguistic compartmentalization, requiring courts to
examine and explain the substantive policies, and thus enlivening
antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor.
A second postulate of the Chicago school writers-a reorientation of substantive antitrust policy around the consumer welfare
model-was also endorsed by the pre-Maricopa Supreme Court.
The Court said that the only relevant question in evaluating a
restraint of trade is whether the restraint promotes or suppresses
competition. 7 By implication, "competition" is not to be viewed
necessarily as a process of independence and rivalry, but as the
outcome of a process. The "promote competition" standard is
meant to focus on whether business activity promotes consumer
welfare by increasing productive and allocative efficiency, and it is
to be guided by economic analysis. 8
Were this develQprnent continued, it, too, would be immensely
significant. The promote/suppress standard is an important and
relatively objective synthesizing principle that allows antitrust analysis to cut through overlapping verbal categories to a realistic appraisal of the possibility that business conduct will promote
efficiency. Indeed, the "promote competition" standard is a simplifying and clarifying coricept. As the Supreme Court appeared to
recognize, combinations in restraint of trade possibly promote cornpetition under three circumstances-when there is integration to
7

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).

8

The consumer welfare model is discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-52 infra.
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efficiency; when the combination overcomes a problem of externalities such as the free-rider problem; and when a combination
reduces transaction costs. These three circumstances define the
range of cases not covered by a per se rule.

II. THE FIRST POSTULATE: THE ROLE OF PER SE RULES
Despite their many benefits, per se rules have been an inadequate component of antitrust analysis, because no coherent theory
has existed for determining when the rules were to be applied. This
significant deficiency reflects confusion about the role of per se
rules and misunderstanding of the substantive antitrust policy that
underlies the rules.
Per se rules, which are ~aid to be applicable to price fixing,
division of markets, horizontal group boycotts, and tying agreements, encapsulate a conclusion that identified conduct is so inherently anticompetitive or so devoid of redeeming virtues that the
conduct is unlawful in and of itself, without regard to the effect of
the conduct or the purpose of those engaging in it. 9 Under per se
rules, both anticompetitive purpose and anticompetitive effect are
conclusively presumed to exist once the forbidden conduct is
proven, so that proof of the forbidden conduct is by itself proof of
an antitrust violation. In contrast, if a per se rule is not applied, the
case must be tried under the rule of reason, which requires the
plaintiff to prove the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the conduct and which permits the defendant to prove that the conduct
achieves legitimate competitive goals. 10
9
The classic summary of per se rules is from Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. I, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use .... Among the practices which the courts have
heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, . . . division of
markets, ... group boycotts, ... and tying arrangements" (citations omitted). There are
many scholarly discussions of the scope and function of per se rules, e.g., Elman, "Petrified
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 625 (1966); Loevinger, The Rule of
Reason i11 Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964); von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-an
Emerging Philosopby of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 569 (I 964); Rahl, Per Se Rules and
Boycotts under tbe Shennan Act: Some Reflectiom on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1959);
Rahl, Price Competition and tbe Price Fixing Rules-Preface 011d Perspectives, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
137 (1962); Comment, Tbe Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U.
CHI. L. REV. 837 (1952); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 142-44 (1959).
10
E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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Because they simplify antitrust doctrine, per se rules often promote such important enforcement goals as ease of application, deterrence, and predictability. 11 The certainty provided by the rules,
however, is often illusory. Although the per se rules tell a court that
issues of purpose and effect are irrelevant to a case in which the rule
is applied, no decision to apply a per se rule can be made until after
analysis, however rudimentary, of whether the rule should be applied. In all but the easiest cases, the determination whether to
apply the rule has been troublesome, largely because few coherent,
consistent standards have existed for making that determination.
Although the per se rules are usually stated as if they were selfexecuting, they are not. 12 The per se rule covering tying arrangements, for example, is not applied until several issues of purpose
and effect are determined. 13 The per se price-fixing rule is strong
but not omnipotent: when independent firms agree to reduce competitign between themselves, without doing more, their conduct is
doubtless unlawful, 14 but not all conduct that might literally or
11
E.g.; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."
12
A similar point is made in Bork, The Rule ofReason and the PerSe Concept: Price-Fixing a11d
Market Divisio11, 74 YALEL.J. 775, 777 (1965): "The current shibboleth of per se illegality in
existing law conveys a sense of certainty, even of automaticity, which is delusive. The per se
concept does not accurately describe the law relating to agreements eliminating competition
as it is, as it has been, or as it ever can be. Alongside cases announcing a sweeping per se
formulation of the law there has always existed a line of cases refusing to apply it. Doubtless
some of the cases in the latter group were wrongly decided, but it would be naive to write
them all off as simply incorrect or aberrational. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the
literal terms of the per se rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those rules, as usually stated,
are inadequate."

13
The per se rule is applied only if the seller is selling two separate products, the tying
product is unique or has market power, and a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the
tied product is foreclosed. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969) (Fort11er /);United S"tates Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977) (Fortner//). Moreover, the per se rule.is not applied if the combined selling of two
products is essential to the seller's goodwill. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
14
The price-fixing per se rule applies to agreements between unintegrated competitors
concerning credit terms, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); contractual terms with customers, Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30
(I 930) (arbitration clauses), United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (I 930)
(completion of existing contracts and cash deposits); discounts, United States v. United
Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.O. Tenn. 1956), aff'dpercuriam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957);
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even analogically be characterized as price fixing is price fixing
subject to the per se rule. 15 Similarly, the per se rule applicable to
horizontal group boycotts is so riddled with exceptions that it is
difficult to restate the rule in a meaningful way. 16
The per se rules became defective because they lost touch with
the substantive policy that prompted their formulation. As a result,
the characterization process-the process of determining whether
the conduct challenged in a lawsuit should be characterized as, for
example, price fixing subject to the per se rule-is often guided by
analytical methods that bear no relationship to relevant substantive
criteria. 17 Even those cases that have correctly avoided the heavy
hand of the per se rules-and there are many 18 -have been forced

United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
markups, Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943);
lraUe-in allowances and list prices, Plymouth Deaiers Ass'n v. UniLed Slales, 279 F.2d 128
(9th Cir. 1960); and trading stamps, United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d
688 (7th Cir. 1961). It applies to agreements between unintegrated competitors not to advertise, United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc. 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961); agreements
to establish uniform costs on which prices can be based, California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n, Ltd. v. United States, !39 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1943); and agreement on terms of
purchase, National JVIacaroni Mfgs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
1

15
E.g., Broadcast Music Industries, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. I
(1979); Evans v. S. S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908
(1977); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Department of Justice, Business Review Letter, August 5, 1980 (granting clearance to cooperative activity with an
impact on prices).
The per se rule against vertical price fixing is counterbalanced by the Colgate doctrine,
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which permits some refusals to deal
with price cutters, and by the doctrine that a seller may determine the prices at which his
agents or legitimate consignees sell. Marty's Floor Covering Co., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 604
F. 2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979).
16
Attempts to synthesize the group boycott cases are legion. E.g., SCLLIVA01, I-lA:--iDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF A:--iTITRCST, 229-59 (1977); Bauer, Per Se lllegality of Concerted Refusals to
Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); McCormick, Group
Roycoll.r-Per Se or Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7 SETO"I I-I ALL L REV. 703 (I 976); Barber,
Rtfusals to Deal under the Federal Antitmst Laws, 103 U. PA. L REV. 847 (1955).
17
Without workable criteria for applying the per se rules, antitrust litigation often centers
on an elaborate semantic game: for example, a court or advocate wishing to avoid the per se
rule against group boycotts must argue either that the conduct is not a boycott (when in fact
it is) or that it is a boycott, but not the type of boycott that is subject to the per se rule. E.g.,
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("We hold that the NFL
player draft is not properly characterized as a 'group boycott'-at least not the type of
boycott that traditionally has been held illegal per se"). Neither approach is satisfactory
unless the classification decision is based on substantive policy.

18
E.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F. 2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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to so torture the relevant doctrine as to make the application of
antitrust law appear whimsical, 19 even when it would not be were it
freed from the semantic grip of the per se rules. In short, without a
theory for deteqpining when the per se rules are to be appliedthat -is, without attention to the substantive policy that underlies
the rules-the rules became formless and opaque.
One of the most ignominious antitrust cases, United States v.
Topco Associates Inc., 20 is illustrative. There, the Court applied the
per se rule that prohibits division of territories between sellers of
different brands (restraints on interbrand competition) 21 to an
agreement in which grocery store members of a joint buying
agency bound themselves to sell the agency's merchandise (a single
brand) in assigned, closed territories (which restrains only intrabrand competition). Despite the district court's thorough rule of
reason analysis upholding the restraint, 22 the Supreme Court eschewed any analysis, even analysis to determine whether the per se
rule should be applied. The restraint was classified as a horizontal
restraint and the Court refused to determine whether the restraint
was different from those horizontal restraints subject to the per se
rule. 23 The Court should not have applied the per se rule at all.
Unlike horizontal interbrand restraints subject to the per se rule,
these "horizontal" restraints were primarily intrabrand restraints
and were ancillary to the integration of grocery stores in a joint
19
Lo"•er federal courts have been ingenious in creating formulas to blunt the force of
literal per se rules. Some courts have established prerequisites for a per se rule. Neeld v.
National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) ("per se rules have only
been applied in the face of arguably demonstrable anticompetitiveness"); Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dmied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Hatley v. American
Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 1977) (per se rule not applied in absence of
"minimal indicia of anti-competitive purpose or effect"). Still other courts avoid the per se
rules by recharacterizing the conduct, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We deal here not with tie-ins, whose adverse effects
and lack of redeeming virtue are by now quite familiar, but instead with approved source
requirements"). Other courts practice benign neglect of per se rules, e.g., Eliason Corp. v.
National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980).
20
405 U.S. 596 (1972).

21
E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (195 I); Addyston Pipe
and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
22

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405

u.s. 596 (1972).

23
The Court's attempt to rely on United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), as a
case "on all fours with this case," 405 U.S. 609, is unpersuasive. In Sealy, where the
territorial restraints accompanied resale price maintenance, the Court had expressly refused
to determine the legality of intrabrand territorial restraints standing alone. 388 U.S. at 356.
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buying agency, providing a justification that should have taken the
7 _,_
.
restramts
out or. . t h e per se ru Ie.-·
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Cominema! T. 11., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, li7c. 25 that nonprice intrabrand restraints imposed
vertically are to be judged under the rule of reason, Topco should be
considered as an endangered species, 26 despite the Supreme Court's
dogged attempts to retain it. 27 But the Topco outcome-which
could have been justified under an appropriate analysis 28 -is less
troublesome than the Court's perversion of the per se rules. Virtually every statement concerning the per se rules that the majority
made in Topco is antithetical to sound antitrust analysis. 29
24
For a fuller discussion of this po'int, see BORIC, THE A:-<TITRCST PARADOX, 276-77
(1978).

25

433

u.s.

36 (1977).

26

Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwim1 Overruled, 1977 SCPREME COCRT HEVTEW 171 (1977);
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the S)'lvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI. L. REv. I, 6-10 (1977); Louis, Restrai11ts Ancillary to Joint Vmtures and Licensing Agreemwts: Do Seal)' and Topco Logical!)' Survive S)'lvania and BMI? 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980).
27
E.g., Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-5R nn.27-2R
(1977); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982).
28
Although Topco members were free to expand into one another's territory if they did
not use the profitable Topco brand, the Topco brand may have been so integrated into their
operations that the members would not expand territories without it. If that were true, the
territorial exclusivity for the Topco brand eliminated interbrand as well as intra brand competition, and that adverse competitive effect might have outweighed the procompetitive
effect of the strong Topco brand. Although the findings of the district court undercut this
theory (see finding 45, 319 F. Supp. at 1037), the government's brief plausibly challenged
that finding. Brief for the United States 30-33.
29
According to Justice Marshall, "(w]hether or not we would decide this case the same
way under the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant," 405 U.S, at 609. This
suggests that cases might be decided differently under the rule of reason than under per se
rules, a nonsensical suggestion that one of the rules is irrational. Justice Burger expressed the
better view in his dissent: "per se rules that have been developed are ... directed to the
protection of the public welfare; they are complementary to, and in no way inconsistent
with, the rule of reason." 405 U.S. 621. Justice Marshall also misperceived the relationship
between the Court and Congress, "Should Congress," he said, "ultimately determine that
predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per sc rules
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of
economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." 405 U.S. 609-10 n.IO. When
Congress passed the Sherman Act, however, it did not legislate predictability as a weightier
value than fidelity, nor did it explicitly legislate any per se rules, much less the rule applied
by the Topco majority.
Justice Blaclunun, who found the Topco result "anomalous" because it would "tend to
stultify Topco members' competition with the great and larger chains," nonetheless concurred in the result on the mistaken theory that "(t]he per se rule ... now appears to be so
firmly established by the Court that, at this late elate, I could not oppose it." 405 U.S. at
612-13. The per se rule, however, had never been firmly established as to territorial intrabrand restraints. Paradoxically, Justice Blaclunun later joined the majority in overturning
the established per se rule applicable to vertical non price restraints. Continental TV., lnc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Most significantly, the existence of a per se rule should not, and
logjcally cannot, preclude a court from determining whether the
peF se rule should be applied. The applicability of the per se rule is
not an issue that is foreclosed by the existence of a per se rule. If the
characteristics of a case are so different from previous per se cases
that the substantive policy embodied in the per se rule is no longer
applicable, the rule should not be applied. It makes little sense to
invoke the per se rule, as Topco did, solely because analysis under
the rule of reas~n is complicated. 30 Whether the per se rule is
applicable is not complicated or beyond judicial capacities; that
issue should rarely be decided on the basis of the difficulty of the
analysis once the rule of reason is invoked. If the per se rule is
inapplicable, it is because the conduct is possibly procompetitive,
and, under most circumstances, any rational attempt to assess com" petitive effects would be better than invoking a per se rule that, by
ignoring procompetitive effects, will inevitably lead to incorrect
results.
Concededly, per se rules rest in part on a judgment that more
extensive analysis would not produce a sufficiently more accurate
assessment of competitive effects to outweigh the costs of the analysis, including both monetary costs and the cost of uncertainty. 31 A
per se rule can therefore be applied whenever a court determines
that alternate analysis is unduly costly. The existence of the per se
rule, however, does not relieve the court from evaluating the costs
and benefits of a more detailed analysis in the case before it. Moreover, although there are undoubtedly situations in which the alleged redeeming virtues of restraints of trade are incapable of being

30
As Chief Justice Burger said in his Topco dissent: "The issues presented by the antitrust
cases reaching this Court are rarely simple to resolve under the rule of reason; they do indeed
frequently require us to make difficult economic determinations. We should not for that
reason alone, however, be overly zealous in formulating new per se rules, for an excess of zeal
in that regard is both contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act and detrimental to the
welfare of consumers generally." 405 U.S. at 624.
31
E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant
administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus
the administrative cost of determining in what particular situations the practice may be
harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the
aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in
individual cases"). Similar views are expressed in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.l6 (1977) and KAYSE;\1 & Tt.:R;-.IER, A;\ITITRL:ST POLICY, 142-44
(1959).
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identified and evaluated efficiently, 32 most forms of procompetitive
collaboration can be identified and evaluated without undue cost. 33
In those cases, a per se rule should not be applied until the appropriate analysis has been completed.
The Court's pre-J11aricopa opinions began to reflect a per se rule
that was attuned more to fidelity to antitrust values than to certainty and thus that was in touch with the substantive policy underlying the per se rules. When it reversed the per se rule applicable to
nonprice vertical restraints, the Court referred to the "demanding
standards" 34 for establishing a per se rule, and noted that although
the per se rules provide procedural advantages, "those advantages
are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se
rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law ·would be reduced to
per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law. " 35 Later, when it refused to apply the per se pricefixing rule to the joint licensing of copyright rights, the Court noted
that the "easy labels [of per se rules] do not always supply ready
ansvvers" 36 and spoke of the importance of examining the substantive policies underlying the rules: 37
As generally used in the antitrust field, "price fixing" is a
shorthand \vay of describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable. The
Court of Appeals' literal approach [in applying the per se rule]
does not alone establish that this particular practice is one of
those types or that it is "plainly anticompetitive and very likely
without redeeming virtue." Literalness is overly simplistic and
often overbroad. VVhen two partners set the price of their goods
or services they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per
se in violation of the Sherman Act .... Thus, it is necessary to
characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without
the category of behavior to which we apply the label "per se
price fixing." That will often, but not always, be a simple matter.
32
This may be true, for e;;ample, of the claim that price fixing between unintegrated
competitors leads to lower capital costs by reducing uncertainty. Other examples of theoretically procompetitive price fixing are in SCHERER, l0iDL:STRlAL 0RGA011ZATI001 ECOc-iOMJCS
509 (1980), and Mason, 1Harket Power and Busi11ess Conduct: Some Commenls, -t6 A/11. ECON.
REV. 471-81 (1956).

33

See text accompanying notes 62-115 infra.

l-1

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., -t33 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).

u !d., n.16.
36

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., +IJ U.S. 1, 8 (1979).

37

ld. at 9.
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More important, although this aspect of the case is generally
overlooked, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States/ 8 the Court made it clear that applying a per se rule is a
matter of substantive policy. At issue in Professional Engineers was an
ethical canon of the National Society of Professional Engineers that
\prohibited competitive bidding by the Society's members. The
Society asserted that the ethical canon was in the public interest,
because competitive bidding would lead to unsafe or unethical
practices. 39 1ts argument rested on a footnote to the Court's prior
Goldfarb opinion that "[t]he public service aspect, and other features
of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. " 40
The Court applied a per se rule, however, and refused to allow
the Society to prove its assertion. Because Justice Stevens's majority opinion repeatedly invoked the term "Rule of Reason," and
because the rule of reason and per se rules are often thought to be
separate analytical categories, some have believed that Professional
Engineers was decided under traditional rule of reason analysis. 41 To
Justice Stevens, however, the "Rule of Reason" contains the analysis necessary to decide whether to apply the per se rule and thus
covers all antitrust cases. Justice Stevens's "Rule of Reason" is not a
rule of reasonableness, but a rule having to do with reasonsY All
38

435 U.S. 679 (1978).
The Court summarized the defense as follows: "[T]he Society averred that the standard
set out in the Code of Ethics was reasonable because competition among professional engineers was contrary to the public interest. It was averred that it would be cheaper and easier
for an engineer 'to design and specify inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures and
methods of construction.' Accordingly, competitive pressure to offer engineering services at
the lowest possible price would adversely affect the quality of engineering. Moreover, the
practice of awarding engineering contracts to the lowest bidder, regardless of quality, would
be dangerous to the public health, safety and welfare. For these reasons, the Society claimed
that its Code of Ethics was not an 'unreasonable restraint of interstate trade or commerce.' "
435 U.S. at 684-85 (footnotes omitted).
39

40

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.l7 (1975).

41

Justice Blaclunun made this assumption in his concurring opinion. 435 U.S. at 700. See
also Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALBA:-.IY L. REV. I, 36 (1979), and
Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Dejini11g the Scope of Exemptions, Expandi11g
Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 265, 322-23 (1979).
42
According to Justice Stevens, "the Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust
inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of
reason.'~ 435 U.S. at 688. Rather, "[t]o evaluate [defendants'] argument it is necessary to
identify the contours of the Rule of Reason and to discuss its application to the kind of
justification asserted by [defendants]." 435 U.S. at 687. After considering these justifications, the Court dismissed them because they "are not reasons that satisfy the Rule." ld.
at 694.
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restraints must be supported by reasons (i.e., justifications) that are
legally acceptable; the "Rule of Reason" determines which reasons
are legally acceptable and which are not. In effect, the decision in
Professional Engineers to disallow defendants' asserted reason for
their restraint is a decision, under Justice Stevens's "Rule of Reason," to apply the per se rule, 43 one that is based on the substantive
policy of the antitrust laws.
Under these pre-Maricopa cases, per se analysis functions as the
keystone of antitrust analysis. A decision to apply a per se rule
should be a decision that the conduct has no redeeming virtues, or
at least none worth considering. Conversely, a decision not to apply
a per se rule should reflect the substantive content of the rule. It
should be based on a conclusion that the conducr in question has
redeeming virtues that are worth trying to evaluate, and should
thus identify the factors that are relevant in a more extended, factual analysis. These are substantive policy decisions and are not
designed merely to simplify antitrust doctrine.

Ill. THE SECOND POSTULATE: THE CONSUiviER
\VELF/i,_RE l\10DEL

The Supreme Court's characterization of the per se rules as
substantive, not procedural, rules is important. Even more important is that in its pre-A1aricopa cases the Court restored the original
vision of policy-based per se rules by identifying the substantive
policies that guide their application.
The Court invoked the familiar promote/suppress standard from
Chicago Board ofTrade44 as the unifying antitrust standard. 45 Under
this standard, if a restraint arguably promotes competition, it is
supported by reasons that require analysis of the net effect of the
restraint. H, on the other hand, the only reason for the restraint is
to suppress competition, it is supported by no acceptable reason
and is therefore unlawful per se.
43
Justice Stevens's notion that per se cases are a category of cases under the Hule of
Heason has not been repeated by the Court. Indeed, when Justice Stevens wrote the 1l1aricopa
opinion, note 5 supra, he did not capitalize "rule of reason." It is nonetheless clear that a court
must examine the reasons advanced to justify a restraint before deciding in which category to
place it.

-H

Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

45

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
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At one level the promote/suppress standard appears paradoxical.
If "competition" means business rivalry, then all restraints of trade
suppress competition and should be unlawful under the standard.
For example, when the seller of a business agrees not to compete
with the buyer of the business, competition is suppressed in the
sense that the restraint eliminates the potential rivalry of the seller.
Hence, if competition is equated with rivalry, a literal
interpretation of Professional Engineers might "call into question the
classic ancillary restraints" 46 or preclude a court from considering
ethical or safety norms, even though the Supreme Court has said
that those restraints are to be evaluated under the rule of reason. 47
The explanation for this apparent paradox is that the Court uses
the consumer welfare model articulated by Professor Bork48 to apply the promote/suppress standard. Under this model, competition
is seen not as a process of rivalry but as a process that maximizes
consumer welfare by maximizing both allocative and productive
efficiency. Competition is thus promoted by increasing the
efficiency of markets, even if a reduction in rivalry results. The
promote/suppress standard thus permits rivalry to be restrained in
order to maximize efficiency and consumer welfare.
Although the Burger Court has not explicitly endorsed the consumer welfare model, the promote/suppress standard and the
Court's pre-Maricopa decisions are intelligible only if interpreted in
the light of that model. Moreover, in those decisions the Court
often used language suggestive of the consumer welfare model. For
example, the Court cited Robert Bork's contention that the Sherman Act is a "consumer welfare prescription"49 and noted that "an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would appear
to lack any objective benchmarks. " 50 Moreover, said the Court,
antitrust analysis is to focus "directly on the challenged restraint's
impact on competitive conditions" 51 to determine "whether the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost

46

Robinson, Recmt Antitrust Developll;mts-1979, 80 COLIJM. L. REv. I, 17 (1980).

47

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 (1978).

48

BORK, THE fu"\ITITRUST PARADOX (1978).

49

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).

° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.

5

51

36, 53 n.21 (1977).

National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. " 52 The last
phrase captures the central theme of the consumer welfare model:
conduct that restricts output by reducing allocative efficiency is
unlawful because it reduces consumer ·welfare. Conduct that increases productive efficiency without a counterbalancing restriction
of allocative efficiency is lawful because it promotes consumer \Velfare.
By interpreting the promote/suppress standard in the light of the
consumer welfare model, the Court made the standard a potentially
potent synthesizing principle.
A. SUPPRESSING COMPETITION: THE POLICY UNDERLYING THE
PER SE RULES

In Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens identified the central substantive policy underlying the per se rules, linking that policy directly to the first case to use the term "per se," United States v.
Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 53 As stated by Justice Stevens, antitrust analysis "does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable,"S+ so the purpose of antitrust
1
• "'
L
a.na1ys1s
lS not to oec10e wnetuer a poilcy lavonng compennon JS
in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by Congress. " 55 Because competition is always
in the public interest, antitrust analysis does not permit "inquiry
into the reasonableness of the prices set by private agreement" or
"argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and
commerce than competition. " 56 Accordingly, the Society's attempt
in Professional Engineers to justify its restraint "on the basis of the
potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the
ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on
the basic policy of the Sherman Act, " 57 providing no "reasons that
1

5

'

;) 310
55

1

1•

r

•

.•. •

•

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., +tl U.S. I, 19-20

(I 979).
54

'1

u.s.

150 (1940).

435 U.S. at 696.
!d. at 692.

56

!d. at 689.

57

!d.

nt

695.
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satisfy the Rule [of Reason]" 58 and thus requiring no factual analysts.
I~ short, the per se rules wield their power because they express
the substantive conclusion that restraints may not be justified by
the argument that without the restraint the competitive process
would be undesirable, destructive, or contrary to the public interest. Under the consumer welfare model, restraints that are unable
to improve efficiency cannot be justified on any other basis.
Justice Stevens also clarified the Goldfarb footnote and the relevance of the Society's argument that the professional aspects of
engineering require less stringent analytical standards than are normal. The Court denied that the "cautionary footnote" of Goldfarb
could "be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of
Reason for learned professions. " 59 Instead: 60
[W)e adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by their
nature, professional services may differ significantly from other
business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services may vary. Ethical norms may serve to
regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the
Rule of Reason. But the Society's argument in this case is a far
cry from such a position .... [W]e may assume that competition
is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a
reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with
competition.
In other words, special considerations relating to the professions
might influence analysis under the rule of reason, but they do not
affect analysis of whether to apply the rule of reason. Thus, when
competitors "regulate and promote" competition by prohibiting unethical practices, the rule of reason requires a court to consider
whether aspects of the professions are relevant to "the nature of
competition" within the profession. In contrast, a decision to apply
a per se rule depends only upon examining the reasons advanced to
justify a restraint to see if they are "cognizable under the Sherman
Act," 61 and that examination is the same for professions as for other
business. Because the defendants in Professional Engineers restrained
competition and not unethical practices, a per se rule was applica58

!d. at 694.
!d. at 696.
60 !d.
61 !d.
59
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ble, and the rule's impact "\Vas not changed because the restraint
involved a learned profession.
B. PROMOTING COivlPETITION THROUGH TRADE RESTRAINTS

Although the "suppress" side of the promote/suppress standard
captures the central antitrust principle that consumer welfare is
always in the public interest (unless Congress deems otherwise),
the "promote" side of the standard is far more interesting and intricate, in part because defendants generally will have the burden of
proving that their restrictive agreements promote competition.
Analysis of the three ways that trade restraints promote competition shows that the promote competition standard is an economicsoriented theory aro~nd which an.titrust doctrine can be developed,
predicted, and evaluated.
1. Integration to efficiency. The predominant form of procompetitive competitor collaboration-and the form that is easiest to recognize and evaluate-is integration to efficiency. The law protects
worthwhile integration by permitting restraints that are necessary
to facilitate savings of resources or improvements of quality. This
strain of tl1e market efficiency theme is pervasive, evident not only
in the law applicable to mergers 62 and joint ventures, 63 where it has
long been recognized, but also in the la-w relating to tying arrangements,64 group boycotts, 65 and price fixing. 66
62
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defmse: The Welfare Tradeojfs, 58 AM. Eco:-.~. REV.
18, 21 (1968); BORK, THEA:-.ITITRCST PARADOX 198-201 (1978).
63
E.g., Justice Department, A."JTITRCST GCIDE FOR 10JTER:-.JATJ001AL 0PERATl00JS 13
(Jan. 26, 1977); Pitofsky, Joint Vmtares Under tbe Antitmsl Laws: Same Reflections 011 the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 I-lARV. L. REv. 1007, 1014-16 (1969).

64
E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (package
sale of two items substantially reduces seller's costs and is therefore not unlawful); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 65 3 (lst Cir. 1961), ccrl. dwied, 368 U.S. 931
(1961).
65
E.g., Instant Delivery Corp. v. Cities Stores Co., 28+ F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(integrating delivery services of independent department stores and using one carrier is not
an unlawful boycott); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1955) (no conspiracy when one publisher establishes a distributor and all other publishers shift business to that distributor); Parmelee T ransp. Co. v. Keeshin, 144 F. Supp.
480, 186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. III. 1958, 1960), affd, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 368
U.S. 944 (1961); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 405 F.
Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii 1975) (joint worlunan's compensation plan not unreasonable).
66
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Evans v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
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Integration occurs when independent firms pool resources to
achieve a task; integration results in efficiencies when it permits the
firms to avoid costs or to improve quality; integration is worthwhile
when firms could not otherwise achieve the efficiencies as quickly.
When a restraint is ancillary to an integration that provides efficiencies not otherwise obtainable, a court must apply the rule of
reason to determine whether the value of the market efficiency
achieved by integration outweighs the adverse effect of the restraint.
Two recent Supreme Court cases nicely illustrate the difference
between restraints that are ancillary to integration and those that
are not.
Performing rights organizations like ASCAP and BMI were organized by composers to facilitate the enforcement of rights under
the copyright laws. Both organizations hold nonexclusive licenses
from copyright owners. They sublicense their rights to copyright
users and distribute the proceeds to the copyright owners in accordance with a schedule that reflects, among other things, the frequency and nature of use of each copyrighted work. Both organizations refuse to sublicense individual works. They grant only
blanket licenses that cover all works in which they have an interest.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 67 CBS
challenged the blanket license policy. CBS did not claim that
ASCAP and BMI agreed to any term of sale. CBS claimed instead
that by establishing a price for its blanket license, each performing
rights organization independently engaged in price fixing that is per
se unlawful.
The Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule, finding that
"the challenged practice may have redeeming competitive virtues
and that the search for those values is not almost sure to be in
vain. " 68 More particularly, the blanket license "accompanies the
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use. " 69 The blanket license "is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies,

u.s.

67

441

68

441 U.S. at 13.

69

/d. at 20.

1, 20 (1979).
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and a necessary consequence of [a blanket] license is that its price
must be established." 70 Thus, the per se rule was inapplicable.
In contrast, Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 71 involved competitors coordinating, not integrating, their operations. The defendants, competing beer distributors, had agreed to stop selling on
credit. Although the per se rule had long been thought to outlaw
agreements betw~en independent firms covering any aspect of
price, 72 including agreements covering credit terms, 73 both the district court 74 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 75 refused to
apply the per se rule. The Ninth Circuit characterized the credit
agreement as a nonprice agreement, akin to product standardization, which "may actually enhance competition. " 76
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed this
derogation of the per se rule. 77 Holding that credit is an aspect of
price, so that a horizontal agreement on credit terms is subject to a
literal application of the per se rule, rhe Court also held that prior
cases "foreclose both of the possible justifications" 78 suggested by
the Ninth Circuit. The argument that by reducing credit competition the defendants would induce new, procompetitive entry \vas
said to be identical to- ::Jro·ninQ
--- 0 u that comoetitor.s shonld be Jllowed to
make entry attractive by agreeing to raise prices. The per se cases
had rejected that argument. 79 Similarly, the argument that by reducing credit competition the defendants might increase price visibility and thus increase overall competition was unacceptable under
the per se rule. "Any industrywide agreement on prices will result
in a more accurate understanding of the terms offered by all parties
1

-

-

- -- - - -

70
ld. at 21. On remand, the court of appeals found the blanket license policy to be lawful
under the rule of reason. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Cotnposers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. CL. 1-191
(I 98 I).
71

4-+6 U.S. 643 (1980).

72

See note 14 mpra.

73

United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 4-J. (1930) (agreement to lease
to those making cash deposits).

only
71
•

See 446 U.S. 643 (1980).

75

605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979).

76

ld. at I 099.

77

446 U.S. at 648.

78

!d. at 646.
!d. at 649.

79
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to the agreement" 80 but, under the per se rules, no such agreement
is permitted. As a result, the defendants' agreement to eliminate
credit was unsupported by permissible reasons and was therefore
unlawful per se.
The Court's reasoning is sound. Catalano involved no integration
offunctions, only coordination of operations. Moreover, the defendants could not convincingly argue that their agreement integrated
the market to make it operate more efficiendy. In short, no resource
savings counterbalanced the loss of competition flowing from the
restraint, and the restraint was therefore per se unlawful.
2. Externalities,Jree-riders, and optimal investment. The second way
in which trade restraints may increase market efficiency is by overcoming misallocation of resources caused by externalities-the
costs and benefits of economic activity that are not reflected in
market prices. 81 Investment decisions made in the market will
reflect consumer welfare as long as all social costs and benefits of
the activity are included in market prices; all investments that consumers are willing to pay for, but only those investments, will be
generated by the market. As a result, in a competitive system it is
ordinarily presumed that market forces, not government or private
restraints, should govern investment decisions.
The problem of externalities, however, may mean that investment decisions reached through market mechanisms are inappropriate. When the value of commercial activity can be appropriated
by consumers (and competitors) without payment, underinvestment in that activity is likely because the rewards of investment are
reduced. This is true, for example, for so-called public goods 82 goods such as national defense that benefit even those who do not
pay for them. Conversely, when economic activity imposes costs
on the public or competitors that are not included in market prices,
too much investment may take place. Under such circumstances,
intervention in the market to overcome the resource misallocation
caused by externalities may increase market efficiency and thus be
procompetitive.
80

ld.

81

E.g., MIS HAN, EcONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 85-111 (1975); Bator, The Auatomy

of Market Failure,

72

Q.J. EcoN.

351 (1958).

E.g., Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 387
(1954); Oakland, Public Goods, Pe1ject Competitiou, m1d Unde1productioll, 82]. PoL Eco:'>!. 927
81

(1974).
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The problem of externalities is an important integrating concept in the la-vvs relating to the competitive system. It serves as a
justification for environmental and ~afety regu1ation 83 and as the
primary economic support for the prohibition on copying and imitation found in the law of copyrights, 84 patents, 85 and unfair competition. 86 In antitrust, the free-rider problem is the externality that
has attracted the most attention. 87 It is thus significant that the
Supreme Court accepted the free-rider argument as a legitimate
justification for nonprice vertical restraints. 88 Non price vertical restraints may increase investment in services provided by dealers
and distributors, and thus increase market efficiency, by assuring
that consumers and competitors will not benefit from such investment without paying for it.
The problem of externalities, however, is not limited to vertical
distribution restraints. For example, when Justice Stevens analyzed
the venerable Mitchell v. ReyJlold.r89 in Professional Engineers, 90 he
showed that concern for the free-rider problem is a long-standing
antitrust theme. Jvfiichel! v. Reynolds approved a noncornpetition
agreement given by the seller of a business-a ci::~ssic restraint of
trade imposed to overcome a free-rider problem. A perso:n \vho
sells his business is a potential free-rider on the value of the goodwill transferred with the business, because his established business
relationships and accumulated know-how permit him to appropriate inexpensively the customer goodwill and business opportunities
he transferred to the new owner. The law therefore permits the
seller to agree not to compete with the buyer of the business in
83
Breyer, Aualyziug Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Lcss Restricth;c Altemati"ues, aud Reform,
92 I-IARV. L. REV. 549, 555 (1979).
34
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Stti!~Y
Computer Programs, 84 l-IARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).

of Copyright

in Boo/IS, Photocopies, and

115
l'dachlup, .rln Economic Review oftbe Patmt System, Study No. 15 of the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th
Con g., 2d Sess. (1958); Arrow, Economic 'vl'elfare and the Allocation of Resources for hiVmtion, in
THE RATE Ai-lD DIRECT!Oi-l OF l01VE0/TIVE ACTIVITY (National Bureau of Economic Research) 617 (1982); Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Eco01. 12
(1969); Kitch, Tbe Nature and Functiou of tbe Patmt System, 20 J.L. & Eco01. 265 (1977).
86
KITCH & PERLMA01, LEGAL REGL"LATI001 OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 2d ed., 48-53
(1979); International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
37

E.g., POS0/ER, ANTITRL"ST LAW, 147-67 (1976).

88

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).

119

1 P. Wms. 181,24 Eng. Rep. 347 (ch. 1711).

90

435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
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order to overcome this free-rider possibility and protect the value of
the business being transferred. Such a restriction, if reasonable, is
upheld because "the long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself-and thereby providing incentives to develop such an enterprise-outweighed the temporary and limited
loss of competition. " 91
Free-rider problems also underlie permissive treatment in some
price-fixing and boycott cases. 92 For example, restrictions on hiring
by organized athletic teams may be- justified as necessary to avoid
the possibility that one team will impose costs-in the form of
decreased reputation 93 or safety94-on the other teams without having to compensate for those costs.
Identifying the problem of externalities as a justification for trade
restraints shows the relationship between cases previously thought
to be unrelated. The externalities problem is not, however, an
acceptable justification in every antitrust context, 95 so care must be
taken in its application. Courts should focus their analysis of particular cases on whether circumstances exist that give rise to a genuine
problem of externalities; whether the investment induced or saved
by the restraint is significant enough to ourvveigh the restrictive
91

435 U.S. at 688-89.
Bork, The Rule of Reaso11 a11d the Per Se Co11cept: Price-Fixi11g a11d Market Divisio11, 75 YALE
L.J. 373, 457-64 (1966) (analyzing United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp.
!53 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) and United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental System, Inc., !56 F.
Supp. 800 (D. Kans. 1957, aJJ'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1957)). See also Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild
Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (price
restrictions on sales outside assigned territories should be treated as territorial restrictions).
93
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Manok
v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (not a violation to
suspend plaintiff, after a hearing, for fraudulent activities intended to manipulate handicaps).
Co11tra, Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
94
Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (prohibition on hiring
one-eyed hockey player is justified). See also Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v.
Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967)
(restrictions on dealing between florists in integrated network may be necessary to prevent
cream skimming). The court appears to have misused the free-rider analysis in Yoder Bros.,
Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977) (restrictions on distribution of unique plant cuttings per se unlawful by analogy
to Fashio11 Origi11ators' Guild).
95
E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (secondary
boycott not justified to overcome free-riding-style piracy). Compare Cheney Bros. v. Doris·
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (copying fabric designs is not unfair competition). The
author's view that the free-rider problem does not explain or justify resale price maintenance
is articulated in Gerhart, The "Competitive Advalltages" Expla11atio11 for lntrabra11d Restraillfs: A11
A11titr11St A11alysis, 1981 DtJKE L.J. 417 (198 1).
92
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features of the restraint; and whether the externalities can be overcome by any less restrictive means.
C. REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS

Collaborative conduct may also increase market efficiency by
reducing transaction costs-the costs of matching buyers and
sellers. 96 Unlike the model of pure competition, 97 in real markets
information is not ubiquitous or costless. It is costly to search for
goods and for information about goods, to bargain over terms of
sale, and to enforce bargains. Uncertainty is pervasive, and measures to reduce uncertainty or control risks are costly. As a result,
market output is increased when restraints reduce information or
bargaining costs, overcome impediments to the flow of information
and efficient bargaining, or reduce uncertainty. Several examples of
procompetitive restraints that reduce transaction costs are illustrative.
1. Integration to reduce bmgaining costs. Transaction costs are reduced, of course, ·when integration of activities eliminates duplicate
barg;~ining efforts and thus reduces the cost of bargaining, as in
Broadcast 1Husic98 and several cases upholding joint sales agencies. 99
The antitrust issues in such cases are similar to those in any cases of
integration, namely, (l) whether the integration is reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies, and (2) whether restraints flowing
from the integration are truly necessary to achieve the integration.
When both questions are answered affirmatively, it may safely be
concluded that the procompetitive effects of the integration outweigh any resulting loss of competition.
2. Otganization to reduce search costs. The amount and quality of
information available about the market significantly affects search
costs-the costs of knowing and evaluating the options the market
96
See generally WILLIAMS001, MARKETS A01D HIERARCHIES: A01ALYSIS A01D A01TITRGST ·
!MPLICATI001S 20-40 (1975).
97

E.g., MA01SFIELD, MICROEC0010MICS 2H-35 (2d ed. 1975).

98

441 U.S. 1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.

99
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. H4 (1933); Webster County Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of
1950, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Compare Virginia Excelsior /VIills, Inc. v. FTC, 256
F.2d 538 {4th Cir. 1958); United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834
(S.D.N .Y. 1960). See also L.C.L. Theatres v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., 566 F.2d 494 (5th
Cir. 1978) (collective surveillance of plaintiff's movie theater to check on alleged underreporting of revenue is permissible).
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provides. 100 Efficient amounts of appropriate information may not
be generated by the market, however, without competitor collaboration or government intervention, because of the public goods
characteristic of information, 101 and because persons will not want
to divulge information without a promise that the recipients will
reciprocate. As a result, in the absence of a restriction of output,
numerous forms of restraint ancillary to information improvement
are sanctioned by the antitrust laws-information exchanges
among competitors, 102 organized trading exchanges, 103 and product
testing and rating. 104
The problem of search costs and the explanation of the way in
which quality, safety, and ethical norms may promote efficiency 105
explain why the Court in Professional Engineers said that "[e]thical
norms may se'rve to regulate and promote ... competition" 106 and
thus fall outside the per se rules. When it is costly for consumers to
evaluate products, it is difficult for them to reward the products
they like with higher prices; prices will reflect the average quality of
all interchangeable products, both good and bad. As a result, the
100
See Benham, Tbe Effect of Advertising on tbe Price of Eyeglasses, IS J.L. & EcoN. 337, 338
(1972); Nelson, Itiformatioll and Consumer Bebavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Stigler, Tbe
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
101
Arrow, Economic Welfare and tbe Allocation of Resources for lnvmtion, in THERATE AND
DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 609 (1962); Posner, Information and Antitrust, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1186, 1193 (I 979).
101 Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 885 (1976) (exchanging information on plaintiff's creditworthiness is not unlawful
where there is no incentive for joint action or uniform conduct); FTC Advisory Opinion
(1969); 16 C.F.R. § 15:361 (1980) (permitting trade association credit reporting so long as
each member makes own decision and certain protections are afforded).
103
See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Danville Tobacco
Ass'n v. Bryant-Buclmer Associates, Inc., 333 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964) and 372 F.2d 634 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817 (lOth Cir. 1965), cert. dmied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966); United States v.
Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
104
Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.

1939); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d ISS (9th Cir. 1968), cert. dmied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969). See
Note, Promoting Product-Quality ltifonnation: A Proposed Limited Allfitrust Exemption for Producers, 30 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1978).
105
See Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licmsing: A Tbeory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J.
POL. EcoN. 1328 (I 979); Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaillfy and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970); Oi, Tbe Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL]. EcoN. 3
(I 97 3).
106

438 U.S. at 696.
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incentive for any seller to improve the quality of his products is
decreased and the incentive to take a free ride on the quality of
other products is increased; that is, there will be underinvestment
in product quality. -When competitors eliminate poor or unsafe
products, the average price of products will rise (reflecting the
increase in average quality), and the proper investment incentive
will be restored. Under such circumstances, restraints of trade may
promote consumer welfare by helping to overcome the effects of
imperfect consumer knowledge.
'
This is not an argument that quality or ethical norms always.
increase efficiency and consumer welfare. Moreover, product
norms may be inferior to other, more direct, means of overcoming
the problem of insufficient consumer information. 107 But the promote side of the promote/suppress standard is broad enough to
permit such sources of consumer welfare to be considered, and the
reasonableness test is flexible enough to permit a court to determine
whether the prerequisites of this argument have been metnamely, whether the characteristics of the market (particularly the
cost of consumer information) are such that oualitv and safetv
norms are likely to increase -·welfare, \Vhether the norms as articulated and applied limit only objectively unsafe and substandard
products, and whether other means of overcoming consumer information problems-for example, disclosure requirements-are
superior means of achieving the same end.
3. Transaction costs and product standardization. Product standardization is a particular form of competitor collaboration that may
reduce transaction costs and thus promote competition. Establishing and policing product grading standards, 108 for example, reduces
a consumer's cost of evaluating products. Exchanging information
about product specifications may reduce the cost of competitive
imitation, an important source of consumer welfare. 109 Establishing
standard sizes may facilitate handling. And establishing standard
---

'

J

rl

./

107
For example, disseminating product information to enable consumers to evaluate products may permit greater product differentiation and thus reward and encourage product
improvement. Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market
Place, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 75 (1974).

108
See, e.g., Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247, 1254
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rating motion pictures not unreasonable). Cf Dept. of Justice, Business
Review, Transportation Association of America, June 24, 1968 (standardizing terms of
reference and tariff formats would enhance transportation competition).
109
Cf Smith v. Chane!, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (accurately comparing copied
product to original is not trademark infringement or unfair competition).
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product characteristics may facilitate product interconnection, as
when the circuitry of audio components is standardized, or interchangeability, so that, for example, replacement parts can be purchased from any of a number of sellers. For these types of standardization, the risk of anticompetitive harm is small enough and
the possibility of economic benefit great enough to support treatment under the rule of reason.
The Court's opinion in Catala11o, 110 in contrast, exposes the limits
that have been placed on the product standardization argument.
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to invalidate a horizontal agreement
eliminating credit sales was based on its belief that the elimination
of credit might be procompetitive, because it would channel rivalry
away from nonprice competition and toward price competition by
simplifying transactions and eliminating the "distraction" of nonprice terms. Although the Ninth Circuit's characterization of credit
as a nonprice term is questionable, 111 the characterization issue is
only a semantic quibble: the central issue is whether it is permissible for competitors to channel competition toward one form
rather than another.
r'h
]'
' '
'
' 1ar 1orms
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.C
'
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Oi r1va1.ry, r1ow..:.
ever, does not legitimately reduce transaction costs. The defendants in Catala11o were not trying to give consumers more information about the market. Their argument was that consumers and the
market process would benefit if there were less information about
credit terms, because consumers would then focus on information
(about prices) that would be more to their advantage. This is not an
argument that increasing the amount of information leads to transactional efficiency, but that consumers should be protected from
their own misuse of information generated by the market. 112 That
argument is inconsistent with consumer welfare. When credit competition is flourishing it is presumably because consumers have
chosen credit rivalry over price rivalry. 113 If the consumer soverI !0

111

446 U.S. 643 (1980).

See note 14 supra.
In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected a similar protectionist argument advanced to justify government restraints on commercial speech. Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976}.
113
If there were a free-rider problem in the provision of information, one could not be so
confident that consumers get the information they really want; but no free-rider problem is ·
apparent in Catalm1o.
112
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eignty underlying a market economy is to be preserved, that decision should be respected and protected. 114
The distinction between legitimate product standardization and
the "standardization" in Catalano is clear. The standardization in'
Catalano was not to provide information to make competitive offerings comparable. h was to make them comparable by homogenizing them, reducing them to simplified terms by eliminating some
forms of competition. This, as the Supreme Court said, 115 is no
different from homogenizing and simplifying transactions by agreeing to sell at a single price and was therefore correctly held to be per
se unlawful.

IV.

MARICOPA: THE COURT STUMBLES

Had the Supreme Court recognized the substantial doctrinal
synthesis it achieved in its pre-Maricopa cases, it would have written
a much different opinion in Maricopa. Its Maricopa opinion is retrogressive: it champions a wooden, mechanical view of the per se
rules and fails to recognize the full range of circumstances in which
trade restraints may promote competition.
Maricopa involved an agreement in which nonaffiliated doctors
established a maximum price schedule for services they provide
patients insured by sponsoring insurance carriers. The plaintiff,
the State of Arizona, moved for summary judgment, claiming that
the maximum price fixing was a per se antitrust violation. The
Ninth Circuit refused to apply a per se rule, noting that too little
was known about either the effect of the agreement or the health
care industry to permit the per se rule to be invoked. 116
The Supreme Court, applying the per se rule to invalidate the
agreement, reversed. Justice Stevens's opinion for the plurality
paid little attention to the economic impact of the maximum price
fixing in the context in which it was employed. Instead, the out1

,.. Thus, in Catalano, the Court rejected the argument that "nonprice" competition is less
significant than price competition, just as it earlier rejected the argument that the nonprice
competition induced by vertical nonprice restraints is less significant than price competition.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56, n.25 (1977) (an argument
"flawed by its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting
from vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about P!1oduct availability, price, quality, and services").
11
; 446 U.S. at 649.
116

643 F.2d 553, 556 (1980).
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come rested largely on the longevity and procedural simplicity of
the per se price-fixing rule. Thus, Justice Stevens stressed "the
costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason" 117 and
openly acknowledged the loss of fidelity when per se rules are
applied: "For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency,
we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a
full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable. " 118 These
statements signal a retreat from the promote/suppress standard,
because they imply that restraints that potentially promote competition may nonetheless be subject to the per se rules. The Court
made that conclusion clear: "The anticompetitive potential inherent
in all price-fixing agreements," said the Court, "justifies their facial
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for
some." 119
Justice Stevens's emphasis on the certainty and automatic nature
of the per se rules is a throwback to the worst aspects of Topco. 120 By
implying that per se rules can be applied without considering policy implications whenever something called price fixing is observed, the Court lost sight of the fundamental principle that it had
recognized in the cases beP.veen Topco and Aifaricopa: neither the
existence of the per se rules nor the certainty provided by the per se
rules enables a court to determine whether to apply the per se rule.
The decision to apply the per se rule can be made only after a court
determines whether the reasons advanced to justify the restraint are
the type of reasons that are acceptable under the promote/suppress
standard, that is, whether the restraint possibiy promotes competition in one of the three ways described above. To ignore this principle undermines sound antitrust analysis by sacrificing fidelity for
certainty. 121
The Court was no doubt influenced by its belief that the per se
117
118
119
120

102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982).
!d.
102 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (1982).

See text accompanying notes 20-33 supra.
121
Even more remarkable, perhaps, is Justice Stevens's notion, also dredged from Topco,
see note 29 supra, that per se rules "enhance the legislative prerogative to amend the law,"
because they put the onus on Congress to create exceptions to the per se rules. 102 S. Ct. at
2478. Congress, however, did not enact the per se rules; it enacted a statement of principlefaith in efficiendy functioning markets-for the Court to apply. Congress should not be
expected to remedy every derogation of that principle that results from a misapplication of
per se rules.
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rule against maximum price fixing is based on sound policy. The
rule arose virtually without examination or explanation at a time
when the Court geared its antitrust policy toward protecting the
autonomy of businesses rather than toward identifying and protecting business arrangements that promote efficiency. 122 The rule
arose, moreover, in cases involving vertical price fixing, rather than
the horizontal price fixing in Maricopa, so the rule's application in
Maricopa need not have been automatic. 123 Even the Court's list of
the potential anticompetitive dangers of maximum price fixing,
which was an exaggeration, 124 could not excuse the Court from
determining whether this maximum price fixing promoted or suppressed competition.
- When the -Court finally reluctantly considered the argument that
maximum price fixing by these defendants promotes competition,
its analysis was unsatisfactory. Professor Frank Easterbrook has
explained how maximum price fixing in the context of Maricopa
promotes competition by reducing the transaction costs of providing insured medical care. 125 Several factors account for high transaction costs. Because insurers find it difficult to predict the incidence of illness and the cost of treatment, they find it difficult to
estimate the medical care costs they must cover under their
policies. As a result, their premiums are increased to reflect the risk
that their estimates will be erroneous. The difficulty of predicting
insurance payouts is exacerbated by the "moral hazard" problem
typified by insurance: an insured person has no incentive to shop
for low-cost services, because the insurer, not the insured, pays for
the services. Although insurers have attempted to ameliorate the
problem by agreeing to compensate insureds only for "usual, ordinary, and customary" medical costs, that standard is difficult to
apply. It also requires the insurer and the insured to incur the
additional costs of determining which fees are "usual, ordinary, and
122
E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)
(maximum price "agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom
of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment").
In Maricopa the Court may have reverted to this mode of analysis by concluding that "horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices [are] on the same legal-even if not economicfooting as agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices." 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
123
12

Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 887-90 (1981).

+ ld. at 900-908.

125

ld. at 896-98 (1981). Contra, Kallstrom, Healtb Care Cost Control by Tbird Party Pa)'ors:
Fee Scbedules, and tbe Sberman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 678-84.
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customary." Moreover, both insurers and insureds find it difficult
to evaluate the necessity for, and the quality of, medical care,
which increases further the transaction costs of an efficient insurance system.
These problems of transaction cost are potentially ameliorated
by the maximum price fixing utilized by the doctors in Maricopa.
Because doctors who subscribe to the plan agree to a maximum fee
for covered services, insurers are able to estimate more accurately
their liability under their policies and thus reduce premiums. Insureds find the plan attractive, because they are guaranteed that
their entire cost of service will be covered if they go to a doctor who
subscribes to the plan. With respect to doctors, their maximum fee
is fixed, so they have no incentive to inflate costs by providing more
services than are required. Minimum quality standards are maintained by physician peer review groups, which check on the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatment provided to insureds.126
The Court recognized the strength of these assertions, 127 but
rejected them, because it found that the maximum fee schedule
challenged in Maricopa originated with doctors rather than with an
insurer, 128 as is the case with many other types of medical insurance. The Court apparently viewed fee schedules originating with
insurers to be a less restrictive, but reasonably substitutable, alternative to fee schedules originating with doctors. The Court was
wrong. Doctors may be able to establish maximum prices more
efficiently than insurers, because doctors have better information
about the cost of various medical services and can more easily
determine the maximum prices that will clear the market. If so,
insurer-sponsored maximum price schedules are a more expensive,
and hence less desirable, alternative to doctor-originated maximum
price schedules. The Court recognized this possibility but gave it
little weight, because the possibility was "far from obvious" and
because any efficiencies from doctor-originated maximum fee
126
The defendants' peer review function, which could be characterized as a form of group
boycott, was not challenged in Maricopa. !02 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (1982).

127 The Court found it arguable "that the existence of a fee schedule, whether fixed by the
doctors or by the insurers, makes it easier-and to that extent less expensive-for insurers to
calculate the risks that they underwrite and to arrive at the appropriate reimbursement on
insured claims." 102 S. Ct. at 2477 n. 25.
128

!02 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
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schedules might be offset by the "power of the [doctors] to dictate
the terms of such insurance plans. " 129
The Court's reasoning is inconsistent with sound antitrust analysis. Because jVJaricopa came to the Court on plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, there was no factual record, and the Court
therefore could not determine whether doctors can establish maximum fee schedules more efficiently than insurers. The only issue
appropriately before the Court was whether it is worth the cost to
determine at trial the relative efficiency of doctor-originated maximum fee schedules or whether the relative efficiency of doctororiginated fee schedules could be determined from theoretical analysis so as to avoid a trial. The Court refused to address that issue
and instead hid behind the procedural fix of the per se rules to avoid
the crucial issue. Similarly, the Court's concern that maximum
price fixing may enable doctors to "dictate the terms of insurance
policies" raises a factual issue that the Court could not appropriately address in reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Although the conspiring doctors in Maricopa comprised seventy
percent of the doctors in the relevant market, 130 which made it
legitimate to question their market po\ver, that is no justification for
mvoiong a per se ruie, Decause tne per se rliie assumes rnar me
maximum price fixing would be unlawful whatever the market
power of the defendants.
The Court should have acknowledged that the maximum price
fixing by these doctors might promote competition by facilitating
insured medical care, and it should have then identified the factual
issues raised by that possibility and openly considered whether an
accurate determination of the issues required a trial or whether,
given the cost of a trial, an acceptably accurate answer could be
given through economic analysis. The Court's approach-avoiding
legitimate factual issues in order to shoehorn this case into a per se
rule meant for other contexts-only subverts antitrust analysis.
•

1.

IV.
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CONCLUSION

One of the enduring legacies of the Chicago school of antitrust analysis is the identification of a coherent, unified, and consis129

102 S. Ct. at 2478.

130

102 S. Ct. at 2470.
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tent framework for analyzing antitrust issues. Prior to Maricopa, the
Supreme Court appeared to be using that framework in its own
analysis. The Court's performance in antitrust cases would improve if it continued to do so.
Antitrust analysis would be improved substantially if the Court
would interpret the promote/suppress standard using the consumer
welfare model; that is, if it would examine restraints of trade to
determine whether they improve productive or allocative efficiency. Under this approach, the per se rules would cease to be
viewed as easily applied rules designed to simplify antitrust analysis. Rather, per se rules would be viewed as substantive rules, to be
applied when analysis shows that conduct is unable to improve
productive or allocative efficiency or that it is costly to determine
the efficiency effects of conduct. This approach would not gut the
per se rules. Collaboration between nonintegrated competitors that
has no possibility of increasing productive or allocative efficiency
can be recognized easily; conduct that is now properly subject to
per se rules would continue to be subject to per se rules, and just as
decisively.
At the same time, rational analysis of conduct that might increase
rr ·
1- . .
emciency
wou1a, De improvea. Kecogmzmg tuat
me per se category
is separated from the rule of reason category because of the potential for some conduct to promote efficiency, shows the unity of
antitrust analysis and focuses attention on the substantive criteria
that really matter in evaluating conduct. Moreover, adopting the
consumer welfare model would require courts to consider more
carefully the efficiency-producing properties of conduct and would
thus enliven antitrust analysis with new substantive vigor.
1
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